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RELIABILITY, JUSTICE AND CONFESSIONS: THE
ESSENTIAL PARADOX
RUSSELL L. WEAVER*
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, sur-
rounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of per-
suasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak.'
INTRODUCTION
"Reliability" is a fundamental and necessary component of a just sys-
tem of punishment.2 The absence of reliability divests society of its justifi-
cation for allowing the government to deprive convicted individuals of
their life, liberty or property.3 In the United States, such reliability has too
often been lacking. With the increased use of DNA evidence, more and
more defendants have been able to conclusively demonstrate that they were
wrongfully convicted. 4 These instances of wrongful conviction have often
involved individuals who spent time on death row, awaiting execution,
only to be exonerated. 5
A difficult and troubling question is how our criminal justice system
finds itself in this situation. Undoubtedly, there are instances of prosecuto-
rial misconduct that explain some wrongful convictions.6 For example,
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, Louis D.
Brandeis School of Law.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
2. See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 76 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Craig
Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of Perceived Injustice in Death
Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131 139 (2006) (noting that miscarriages of justice related
to death penalty cases "create the most fundamental doubts about the fairness and reliability of the
criminal justice system."); Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable
Confessions While Respecting Suspects' Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 77 (2006) ("Too much inaccu-
racy and unreliability can undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, real and per-
ceived.").
3. See JOHN M. BURKOFF & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, INSIDE CRIMINAL LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND
WHY 1-15 (Aspen Publishers 2008).
4. See Adam I. Kaplan, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully Con-
victed, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227 (2008) (noting that more than 150 individuals have been exonerated
based on DNA evidence since 2000).
5. See Elizabeth A. Laughton, McKithen v. Brown: Due Process and Post-Conviction DNA
Testing, 2008 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 0007, 2,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2008dltrOO07.pdf (referring to sixteen death row
inmates who have been exonerated based on DNA evidence).
6. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convic-
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prosecutors have withheld evidence, 7 fabricated evidence, 8 or engaged in
other forms of unethical conduct.9 But some wrongful convictions are at-
tributable to systemic failures rather than to prosecutorial wrongdoing. l0
In a prior article, I discussed systemic issues related to the problems of
indigent representation, and how those problems adversely affect poor de-
fendants."I While problems with indigent representation are serious and
can result in wrongful convictions, they are only one aspect of the problem.
In this article, I focus on another problem area in United States criminal
procedure: confessions jurisprudence and its relationship to the issue of
reliability.
I. CONFESSIONS AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Instances of wrongful convictions are all too common in the United
States. Fueled by DNA evidence, which makes it possible for wrongfully
convicted inmates to prove their innocence, most states have seen a rising
tide of wrongful conviction claims. 12 Some of these claims are high profile
and have been accompanied by significant media publicity.
For example, in 2000 Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium
on the imposition of capital punishment in Illinois. 13 He then appointed a
commission to examine whether reforms to the Illinois capital punishment
system could make the system more fair and accurate. 14 The commission's
report studied thirteen death row inmates who had been released from cus-
tody, and concluded that these inmates were either convicted based on in-
sufficient evidence connecting the inmates to their alleged crimes, or their
tions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 399; see also Tim Bakken, Truth and
Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 547, 551 n.9 (2008).
7. See Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective Rooted in
Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 366 (2007).
8. See Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experi-
ment, 2006 WISc. L. REV. 645, 723 n.370.
9. See Cicchini, supra note 7, at 335 ("Prosecutorial misconduct has infected every stage of the
criminal process ranging from the initial charging decision through post-conviction proceedings.").
10. See generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, at xv (Yale University Press, 1932); Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent
Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435,436 (2004).
11. Weaver, supra note 10.
12. See Rachel Steinback, The Fight for Post-Conviction DNA Testing is Not Yet Over: An Analy-
sis of the Eight Remaining "'Holdout States" and Suggestions for Strategies to Bring Vital Relief to the
Wrongfully Convicted, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 331-32 (2007). See generally Michael
Mello, Certain Blood for Uncertain Reasons: A Love Letter to the Vermont Legislature on Not Reinstat-
ing Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 765 (2008).
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convictions had been reversed because of procedural or constitutional ir-
regularities. 15
Illinois is hardly an isolated example. Another study found that since
1973, some one hundred and ten death row inmates had been exonerated of
crimes of which they were convicted. 16 It is no accident that a number of
law schools have responded by creating innocence projects, and the state of
North Carolina has created an Actual Innocence Commission that is author-
ized to investigate claims of wrongful conviction.
17
A disproportionate number of wrongful convictions involve homi-
cide. 18 There are a number of reasons why homicide cases produce such a
high percentage of wrongful convictions, including the difficulty of inves-
tigating homicide cases without the victim's assistance, the fact that the
police are frequently under intense public pressure to solve and obtain con-
victions in homicide cases, and the incentive, especially in capital cases, for
the guilty to frame the innocent. 19 The frequency of wrongful convictions
in death penalty cases has caused individual members of the United States
Supreme Court to raise questions regarding the legitimacy of the capital
punishment regime. 20
Many reasons for wrongful convictions can be offered. In a prior arti-
cle, I discussed problems with indigent representation, and the difficulties
that the poor encounter in obtaining competent representation. 21 Equally
disconcerting are instances of false confessions that have led to wrongful
convictions. 22 DNA evidence has shown that some suspects who confess to
crimes, did not actually commit those crimes.23 One study found that as
many as twenty-one percent of wrongful convictions were based on false
15. Id. at 7-9.
16. See Charles S. Lanier & James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium Movement, and
Empirical Questions: Looking Beyond Innocence, Race, and Bad Lawyering in Death Penalty Cases,
10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 577, 593 (2004).
17. See Darryl K. Brown, The Multifarious Politics of Capital Punishment: A Response to Smith,
94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 57, 60 (2008),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/09/29/brown.pdf.
18. See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2545 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2546 ("In the face of evidence of the hazards of capital prosecution, maintaining a
sentencing system mandating death when the sentencer finds the evidence pro and con to be in equi-
poise is obtuse by any moral or social measure.").
21. See generally Weaver, supra note 10, at 436.
22. See Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2545 ("Most of these wrongful convictions and sentences resulted
from eyewitness misidentification, false confession, and (most frequently) perjury."); see also JIM
DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 92 (Doubleday 2000); Danielle E. Cho-
jnacki, Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert
Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2008).
23. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 22, at 92.
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confessions.24
Any confession, even a false one, can be particularly problematic for
the defense. Both judges and juries are inclined to give a particular weight
to confessions and to assume that they are valid.25 As a result, when the
police are able to extract a false confession from a suspect, the chances of
conviction increase significantly. However, due to the apparent lack of
reliability associated with confessions, some courts have begun to place
less weight on confessions. 26
II. WHY Do SUSPECTS FALSELY CONFESS?
One might speculate about why individuals would confess to crimes
that they did not commit. The confessor must realize that there will be con-
sequences, perhaps serious ones, to a false confession. Granted, some con-
fessors may have limited intelligence and little ability to protect themselves
against police demands. For others there may be reasons, which seem logi-
cal to them at the time, for falsely confessing. For instance, some suspects
may have been tricked into false confessions by unethical police officers. 27
In other instances, suspects may have been coerced or intimidated into
confessing.
Coerced confessions have been a particular problem in the criminal
justice system. Brown v. State of Mississippi provides the classic illustra-
tion of a coerced confession.28 In that case, the defendant was initially ar-
rested, hung by a rope from the limb of a tree three times, and whipped.29
Later, he was re-arrested, whipped again, and told that the whipping would
continue until he confessed. 30 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that a trial is a "mere pretense
where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting solely upon
24. See Bruce M. Lyons, New Committee Looks at DNA and the Death Penalty, 15 CRIM. JUST.,
Spring 2000, at 1, 1. See generally Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interro-
gation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
25. See Stephen A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891, 922-23 (2004).
26. See, e.g., Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1140
(9th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e decline to hold that Osborne's confession.., trumps the materiality of physical
evidence... Such a rule would ignore the emerging reality of wrongful convictions based on false
confessions and the capability of DNA testing to reveal the objective truth and exonerate the inno-
cent.").
27. See generally Patrick M. McMullen, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of
Police Deception in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 971, 971-72 (2005).
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confessions obtained by violence." 31 The Court went on to hold that the
due process clause of the Constitution requires that convictions must be
consistent with "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all of our civil and political institutions. ' 32 As a result, in
Brown, and subsequent cases, the Court made it clear that convictions
could not be premised upon false confessions.33
After the Court prohibited coercive police tactics, the nature of police
tactics began to change. In the famous Miranda v. Arizona case, the police
tactics in question were focused more on psychological techniques than
physical torture. 34 Rather than beating suspects, the police confronted sus-
pects with hostile and intimidating environments, and attempted to obtain
confessions through psychological tactics. They did so by isolating sus-
pects in interrogation rooms, cutting them off from the outside world, and
confronting them with a legal system that they might not fully understand.
As the Court stated, "an interrogation environment is created for no other
purpose than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. The
atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation.
'35
In Miranda, the Court attempted to deal with these psychological tac-
tics by requiring police to administer a Miranda warning to suspects. That
warning calls for that an individual subjected to custodial interrogation be
informed of his right to remain silent, 36 that anything he chooses to say can
and will be used against him, 37 that he has the right to the presence of
counsel during the interrogation, 38 and that counsel will be provided if he
cannot afford it.39 The Court hoped that defendants provided with these
warnings, as well as the opportunity to be represented by counsel, would be
31. Id.at286.
32. Id; see also McMullen, supra note 27, at 977; George C. Thomas, The Criminal Procedure
Road Not Taken: Due Process and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 180-81
(2005).
33. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1991); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
398-401 (1978); see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER, LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JOHN M. BURKOFF &
CATHERINE HANCOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 231-35 (3rd ed. 2008).
34. 384 U.S. 436,449 (1966).
35. Id. at 457.
36. Id. at 467-68 ("At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must
first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.").
37. Id. at 469 ("[T]his warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is
faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his
interest.").
38. Id. ("The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to
overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege under the system we delineate today.").
39. Id. at 472 ("While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have
the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.").
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able to protect themselves against interrogation techniques that violate due
process.
Despite these efforts, Miranda has not proven to be a panacea to the
problem of false confessions. As noted, an extraordinary number of wrong-
ful convictions involve false confessions despite Miranda and related deci-
sions.40 However, Miranda did have a number of beneficial effects.
First and foremost, the Miranda warnings limited the ability of the
police to capitalize on the ignorance of suspects. In any police-citizen en-
counter, the police possess a potential advantage because they are more
likely to know and understand the rules governing these encounters. Sus-
pects are more likely to suffer from both ignorance and fear. In particular,
suspects may believe that they have no choice but to cooperate with the
police, and that they cannot refuse police requests.
41
Prior to Miranda, individuals subjected to custodial interrogations
may have functioned under similar misperceptions. As a result, the
Miranda decision performed a major service by requiring the police, before
interrogation, to inform suspects of their rights, and give them some sense
of the consequences of waiving those rights.
Second, the value of Miranda warnings was enhanced by the fact
that movies, television shows, books, and a variety of other media began to
depict the police administering the warnings. This has helped increase the
public's awareness of its rights in interrogation contexts.
While it is difficult to quarrel with Miranda's conclusion that sus-
pects should be informed of their right to remain silent, it was never clear
that the Miranda warnings are sufficient, in and of themselves, to deal with
the difficulties presented by psychologically-based interrogation tech-
niques. More particularly, Miranda warnings should be regarded as an
initial, positive step towards protecting individual rights. Nonetheless, there
are significant reasons why the Miranda warnings are insufficient by them-
selves to prevent false confessions.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between suspects who
have been taken into police custody and those that have not. Miranda ap-
plies only to "custodial interrogations." When an individual has not yet
been taken into custody, such as when an individual is being questioned in
a private home without having been arrested, the police are free to question
40. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Andrew W. Vail & Howard W. Anderson 111, The Case for Re-
cording Police Interrogations, 34 LITIG. 30 (2008) ("[T]he growing number of convicted defendants
exonerated by DNA evidence, along with recent social science research, forces us to conclude that a
significant minority of suspects falsely confessed to crimes they did not commit, despite the panoply of
procedural protections that our criminal justice system provides ... ").
41. See Russell L. Weaver, The Myth of "Consent, " 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2007).
[Vol 85:1
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the suspect without first giving the Miranda warning. 42 In addition,
Miranda warnings need not be administered during a routine traffic stop.
43
Indeed, even if an interrogation takes place at a police station, where the
suspect is surrounded by the police, the Court may conclude that there is no
custody.44 Under such circumstances, suspects may be scared, unaware of
their rights, and more likely to make incriminating statements. In addition,
if police officers are sophisticated in their use of interrogation techniques,
they can extract incriminating statements from suspects. Once they obtain
an incriminating statement, they are more able to gain additional incrimi-
nating statements.
Even when Miranda warnings are administered, they do not provide
a panacea for the confessions problem. The Miranda warning can be ad-
ministered in a perfunctory manner that undercuts its significance and im-
pact. Even when properly administered, the suspect may still be scared,
fearful of the implications of potential charges, and can wander into discus-
sions with police not fully aware of the implications of doing so. Some-
times this happens because the suspect may not fully understand the
consequences of his actions. 45 At other times, it happens because the sus-
pect slowly slides into discussions with the police.
46
When suspects choose to waive their rights and open themselves up
for questioning, they are often in peril and may not realize it. Some sus-
pects believe that they can talk their way out of their legal problems, and
will agree to speak with the police. But, when they choose to talk to police,
suspects can be subjected to all of the coercive psychologically-based tech-
niques discussed in Miranda. For example, suspects may be surrounded by
the police, isolated in an interrogation room, cut off from the outside world,
and not fully aware of their rights or the legal system. When a suspect is
scared, the suspect may be more likely to make incriminating statements by
mistake.
Moreover, during non-custodial interrogation, the police may not be
precluded from using many of the tactics described in the interrogation
manuals referenced in the Miranda decision. As the Court explained in that
case, those tactics are designed to encourage the suspect to confess. The
police accomplish that objective through a variety of tactics. For example,
as recommended in the interrogation manuals referred to in Miranda, the
42. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1994).
43. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-40 (1984).
44. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
45. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987).
46. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1056 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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police may maintain an air of confidence regarding the suspect's guilt.47 In
other words, interrogators should handle the interrogation with "persever-
ance" and "patience, '48 and should offer the suspect potential legal excuses
for actions to which the police are attempting to have the suspect confess.
49
The interrogator can also employ other tactics designed to negate the sus-
pect's possible defenses.50
The interrogation process is aggravated by the fact that the police can
inculcate fear into a suspect. For instance, police may say, "Gee, this is a
really serious charge. Do you realize that you might end up spending the
rest of your life in jail? That you might even get capital punishment?" The
police may then offer a deal that will allow the suspect to escape the possi-
bility of these severe threatened penalties.51 Under such circumstances, it is
not surprising that a significant number of suspects, fearful of the system
and unable to correctly calculate the likelihood of their conviction of severe
punishment, confess even though they are innocent.52
Even if a suspect successfully negotiates the system for a while, the
suspect may eventually make an incriminating or damaging statement. Part
of the problem is that suspects may not be familiar with the rules of evi-
dence, or the law of admissions. As a result, even though the defendant
makes what he perceives to be an exculpatory statement, it may in fact be
inculpatory. When a suspect makes an incriminating statement, the police
are frequently prepared to pounce on the suspect's misstep. When a confes-
sion is obtained under such circumstances, a defendant who is charged with
crime may face an uphill battle in trying to prove his innocence. Juries tend
to place a great deal of emphasis on confessions evidence and incriminating
statements by an accused suspect.53
As a result, although Miranda was a significant and worthwhile deci-
sion as far as it went, it is no solution to the confessions dilemma. Even
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966) ("[T]he manuals instruct the police to display
an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in
confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact.").
48. Id. at 450-51.
49. Id. at 451-52.
50. Id. ("Having then obtained the admission of shooting, the interrogator is advised to refer to
circumstantial evidence which negates the self-defense explanation.").
51. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008) ("American
police interrogators still presume the guilt of the suspects they interrogate; still attempt to overcome
their resistance and move them from denial to admission; still try to convince then--if by fraud rather
than force-that they have no real choice but to confess; and still exert pressure to shape and manipu-
late their postadmission narratives.").
52. Cf Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises Questions Beyond DNA, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2007, at A-1, A- 12 (discussing trends in cases of convicts exonerated by DNA evidence).
53. See Chojnacki et al., supra note 22, at 5.
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though it is commendable to require the police to inform criminal suspects
of their right to remain silent, such information by itself does not ade-
quately protect criminal suspects against the psychological pressures in-
volved in custodial interrogations. Moreover, Miranda is not a panacea for
false confessions or wrongful convictions.
CONCLUSION
The greater difficulty is to craft a solution that will deal with the
problems of false confessions and wrongful convictions. Despite the grand
statements made by the United States Supreme Court in decisions like Grif-
fin v. Illinois54 and Douglas v. California55 regarding the importance of
mitigating the impact of wealth on the criminal justice process-for con-
fessions and the right to counsel-wealth matters. 56 If a wealthy suspect
realizes that he is under police suspicion, he might place an immediate call
to his lawyer for advice about what to say to the police, and how to respond
to police requests. Because of that advice, the wealthy suspect might be
less likely to make a misstep or an incriminating statement. An indigent
defendant is less likely to have the advice of counsel. While he will receive
the Miranda warning, he is subject to all of the pitfalls of the Miranda de-
cision discussed above.
Of course, the Court could address the confessions problem by re-
quiring that all suspects be provided with counsel prior to interrogation.
However, such a step seems unlikely. The Warren Court, with its era of
expanding criminal rights, is long past. Moreover, it has been quite costly
for the government to comply with the Court's holding in Gideon v. Wain-
wright57 regarding the right for suspects at trial to be represented by coun-
sel. Many states are struggling under the burden. Requiring that all suspects
be provided with counsel prior to interrogation would further increase
costs. Thus, it is unlikely that the Court is going to impose such a require-
54. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). ("There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.").
55. 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (the Court held that the state must provide an indigent defendant
with counsel for his one and only appeal as of right, "where the merits of the one and only appeal an
indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has
been drawn between rich and poor.").
56. See generally Weaver, supra note 10, at 436. In one of the more famous cases in modem
American history, the 0. J. Simpson murder case, the outcome may have been quite different had
Simpson been poor. Even Simpson's lawyer in that case, Johnnie Cochran, admits that "[i]f [0. J.1
Simpson had been poor, he'd be in jail right now, whether he was innocent or guilty. In this country,
you are innocent until proven broke." Patricia Phillips, Meeting Challenges: The Association's History
ofAccomplishment, 26 Los ANGELES LAWYER, Mar. 2003, at 33 (second alteration in original).




One check on wrongful convictions is the use of DNA evidence. In-
deed, DNA evidence has provided the basis for a number of findings of
wrongful conviction, and has been instrumental in reversing some of these
convictions. Of course, DNA evidence is not available or useful in every
case. As a result, in at least some cases, courts must find other ways to deal
with the confessions problem.
Another possible solution is to require that all interrogations be re-
corded on video.58 With modem advances in technology, it is now possible
to obtain inexpensive video recording equipment that can be unobtrusively
used during interrogations. While video recording is not the precise equiva-
lent of physical presence, it can provide greater insight into what happened
during the interrogation process. Another possible solution is to consider
the Japanese approach of prohibiting conviction based on an uncorrobo-
rated confession. 59 Even though this approach has not been sufficiently
studied in the United States, it perhaps deserves greater scrutiny as one way
of helping to prevent wrongful convictions.
58. See Sullivan et al., supra note 40, at 34-35.
59. See Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 317, 351 n.200 (1992).
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